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economy
THE DEX'ELOPMEXT
1868 has been very abnormal. This was
of Jajian's

since the Restora-

tion of

Japan was untrained
the beginning to

in the

inevitable since

system of capitalism, and obliged from

face the competition

of advanced

nations,

with

whom

she was eager to be counted an equal in the shortest possible

time.

I'nder these circumstances. Japan's economic transformation

has been marked by the following characteristics:

1)

the wholesale

importation and eager imitation of occidental capitalism; 2) in this

whole process of imitation the
pioneer and aggressive leader

who

;

]\Ieiii

and 3

)

Government

itself

was the

the samurai were the class

cooperated most readily with the Government in pursuit of thrs

policy of transforming the nation's industries according to the principles of capitalism.

At the time of the Restoration, Japan emerged from a dying
feudalism and was suddenly brought into contact with a highly developed, western capitalism. Since there was not time for adaptation, young Japan had no alternative but imitation. But even a policy
of imitation required some initiative, some spirit of adventure, qualwere pretty generally lacking among the people due to
upon them by centuries of feudalism. Capitalistic enterprises called for risk and adventure, and these the people were too timid to undertake. In such circumstances the Government had to take the lead. This explains why industry in Japan has
been so dependent upon ]mternalism, bureaucratic leadership, and
ities

that

the limitations imposed

protective tariffs.

The men who followed

Government in the imsomewhat slavish, old-fashioned
and craftsmen, but rather the samurai. The whole
the lead of the

portation of ca])italism were not the

farmers, traders,

in the Restoration left this group without
former nieans of supi)ort and therefore rather than undertake
comj^etition with the old economic groujis such as the farmer and
trader classes, thcv arce])U'd tlic lead of the loxcrnmcnt in the new
task of introducing western capitalism, l-'or (his task they were bct-

reorganization involNcd
their

(

written before llie M.incluirian iiuasion vvliioli began in
traces the fieneral (le\ clopnunt of Japanese econonn' since
l)ut emphasizes tiie crisis of caiiitalisni
in
lapan just preceding, and
in some measure responsible for, tliat adventure. (Q.W.)
1'1'liis

1931.
1868.

not

article

only
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ter prepared intellectually than any other class of society and they
went about their new business with great earnestness. Capitalism
came in, therefore, under the wings of the (Government and with
the newly disinherited feudal lords as eager students in the new
economic processes.

The

contrast between ca]Mtalism

in

Euro])e and capitalism

in

Japan is striking. In Europe the development was slow and
and was carried forward by the old economic groups, while here it
was swift and irregular, and promoted by those who, in the old soIn Europe industrialism,
ciety, were not producers but parasites.
regular,

blest

with the freedom inspired by the doctrine of

molded the

political order into

shape

in

accord with

fairc,

laissc::

its

own

require-

is, the state, was from
and protector of industrial capitalism.
In Europe it was an evolutionary process coming up from below in
Japan it was an imitative process sponsored by the state.
Economic growth due mainly to imitation and Government aid

Japan the

m-ents, but in

political order, that

the beginning the promoter

;

reached the limits of

quent to

its

possibilities

While

necessary for further growth.

was on

faire
a

distinctly

tions

during the Meiji

Subse-

era.

independent and creative activity of capitalists became

this,

in

color,

imperialistic

abandoned

this

tendency toward

Japan, capitalism throughout the world

and the advanced

Iaisse.c

took on

capitalistic

their laisscz faire policies in favor of a closer,

cooperative relation between economy and politics.
condition of Japan from
eras of Taisho and

the last

Showa

(

na-

more

The economic

year of the Aleiji era through the

1912^)

presents extremely complicated

characteristics.

As

is

well

known,

Ja]ian's

economic

life

underwent a wonderful

development after the Restoration in 1868. Capitalism reached a
climax in the Taisho era (1912-26). But the very soil in which it
had grown began to lose its nutriment anxl was exhausted by the
time capitalism had reached mature age. In the meantime, various
contradictory factors, corruption and other vices incident to capitalism were precipitated, so that within only sixty years

from the

time of the Restoration. Japan's capitalistic economy met with

ous obstructions.

Some

seri-

space must be devoted to an explanation of

the causes of this situation.

In Europe, capitalistic civilization required two or three centuries for

its

develo]iment. while in Japan

only half a century.

(

)ne reason

it

was accomplished in
was

for this rapid development
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THE MANUFACTURE OE CLOISONNE

when Japan came

IN TAl'AX

she was
had taken,
in other countries, centuries of slow evolution to develop. Because
of this advantage, Japan was able to increase her productive power
and exploit her resources with exceptional rapidity. Large quantities of coal, copper, and other mineral resources, now tapped for the
first time, added to the nation's wealth.
The extended services of
railways and steamships, too, facilitated the utilization of forests
and uncultivated lands as never before, thus greatly increasiiig the
nation's wealth. V>y the use of machinery, as well as the network of
banking and oommercial organization, the utilizable \aluc of labor
and ca])ital increased by leaps and bounds.
lint this imitation and ada])tatiim of occidental sciences and
technical ^kill have been worked to the limit, and now that the
that

in contact -with occidental civiHzation,

able to transplant and imitate scientific techniques which

national

resources

to say that iIhtc

ductive ])ower

Iia\H'

is

1)\-

system,

lia\-e

far as

lieeii

machinei'v,

trans])lante(l as

almost cxhaustt'd,

capitalistic nuiiiods.

been constructed so
other mines

l)ccn

it

is

not too mucli

no prospci^t tor lurtluT incTcasc of

is

all

o\er

induNlrie.s,

ilie

no further exi)ansion.

country.

and

far as considered profitable,

lajian's

pro-

for instance, have

conimercially protitable.

explnjted

clu'i)iit-;il

I\ail\\a\s,

Collieries

The

factories

and

fmancial

ha\e been

for ca])italisni justified
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Another reason for the exceptional economic development in
Japan dnrint^ the years followinoj the Restoration was the sudden
exploitation of ahnndant national resources. Railways and machinery increased producti>e i^ower in a remarkahle manner, while in
agriculture and mining, there

For

was a tremendous advance.
was only

instance, the area of cultivated land about 1877

4,313,000

cJio

considerable

(one

cJ\o e(|uals

2.45 acres).

farm land was given

ri)

to

In spite of the fact that

railways,

houses, by 1913 the total farm-land area had increased to
cho, and by 1922, to 6,090,000

and
5,7^4 000

factories,

In the mineral products, the in-

cJio.

was far more striking. In 1874, for instance, copper production was only 3. .516, 000 kin (one kin e(|ual 1.322 lbs.). This
crease

increased to 110.000,000 kin in

The product

times.

increased to

1913, an increase of aboi^t thirty

180,000,000 kin

in

1*'17.

In the

same interval (1874-1917) the amount of coal mined also increased
from only 208,000 French tons to 21,316,000, or more than a hundred times. By 1919 it had increased to 31.271.000 French tons.
Similar increases were seen in silver, petroleum, sul])hur. and other
mineral products, as shown in Table 1. The development of Japan's
economy, we must admit, owes a great deal to the exploitation of national resources as indicated in these figures.

The

exploitation of these resources, however, reached a climax

during the World \\'ar and from then on gradually failed to keep
pace with the development of national economy. Table 1 shows in

lower columns that the Japanese mineral products, which had
in production to the time of the Great \\'ar, began
to decrease in most cases, especially copper and petroleum, which occupv the second or third position in importance among all mineral
its

been increasing

products.
figures.

Their present output

is

even smaller than the pre-war

In 1913, for instance, the output of copper was 110.000,000

output of petroleum. 1,694,000 kokn (one koku- en^als 39.7
American gallons), which decreased to 101,000.000 kin of copper
and 1,406,000 koku of petroleum in 1927. It has been the same with
the arable land, which was on a steady increase uo to 6,098.000 cho.
kin, the

in 1921. but

a

began to decrease then, down to 6 080.000 cho

decrease of about 20.000 cho as com]5ared with

1027. there
It

is

was no

1921.

in 1926.

During

increase.

a striking fact that the decreases in mineral products

and

farm-land area have been unavoidable and could not be prevented
bv anv such means as extraordinary protection given by the Govern-
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ment. The import duty on copper, for instance, was raised

from ven

1.20 per 100 kin to

yen

(The

7.00.

in

1922,

latter rate represents

a protection amounting to yen 7,000,000 per annum, as the annual

production of copper

is

about 100,000,000 kin

)

The import duty on

.

petroleum, too, was raised in 1924 from yen 0.17 per 10 gallons to

\en

1.70.

In the case of coal, government protection

limiting the import of the cheaper

Fushun

coal,

is

afforded by

but even this has

There is also a special law
Another law, enforced after June, 1919,

not ])revented a decrease in production.
to keep

up the price of

rice.

encourages reclamation by giving" subsidies to persons

who under-

take reclamation for the purpose of cultivation.

Through

ation of these measures, the land reclaimed since

1*^^'21

the oper-

totals 171,471

cho.

The amazing development

of Japan's

economy during

the early

years of the Meiji period, in spite of the difficulty of competing with

low wages of
weapon by which
Japanese capitalists were able to compete with other nations. At
present China enjoys this advantageous position. With the SinoJapanese War as a dividing line, however, wages began to rise at a
rapid rate, as shown in column A of Table 1. Starting from 1873

advanced industries abroad, was primarily due

to the

In truth, low^er wages constituted the one

labor.

with 100 as the index number, prices rose in about twenty years only
to the level of 130 (excepting in 1882, the period for unconvertible

notes).
293.

P>y

1900 the index number had risen to 208, and by

In 1926 the index

current in 1926 w^ere,
thf)se prior to the

rise in

1*'12 to

number reached the peak of 918. The prices
therefore, more than seven times as high as

Sino-Jajianese

War

(1892).

In the meantime, the

wages, as indicated by index numliers, was consideralil}'

less

rapid than the rise in prices.

The extraordinary

rise

in

wages

since

I'^OO

has resulted in a

great increase in the cost of jjroduction and therefore in reducing

compete with foreign industries. This is especially
true of competition with China, where wages are still very low. \'arious industries have arisen in lliat country in recent years which
Jajjan's pow'er to

menace Japan's

industrial development.

therefore, internal as well as external.

sprang up because of low wages
of existence.

lia\e

'Ihe difficulty for Japan is.
Must of the industries which
either declined or gone out
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TABLE
Showinc^

rise in

NO.

IN

i)rices.l

(A)
INDEX NO. OF

VEAR

(b)

INDEX NO. OF
TOKYO WAGES

T0K^O PRICKS

100

1877

110

1882

142

1887

133

1890

159

1

wages and

1873

JAPAN

130

.

1892

130.

1900
1907

208
266

1912

293

141

1917

376

181

1920

842
918

405

1926
IColnmn (A)

100

128

437

numbers for prices in Tokyo starting witli
100 in 1873. Data have been taken from the figures of the Money Investigation Society, the !\Iinistry of Agricuhure and Commerce and tlie Tokyo
Chamber of Commerce.
Column (B) contains index numbers prepared by the Tokyo Chamber of
Commerce regarding wages in Tokyo, starting with 100 in the latter half of
1900. In the case of wages as w-ell as prices, there has been an increase of
contains index

approximately 4507c since 1900.

The war with China
05 were turning^ points

in

in

1894-95 and the war with Russia in 1904Japan's industrial development.

One

of

main causes for this sudden and extraordinary economic development after these wars was the growth of Japan's imperialism. During these years there was a rapid increase in the export of manufactured articles to the colonies and China. Trade statistics show
that exports to Korea, Formosa, and Kwantung (a sort of Japanese
colony) from 1898 to 1902 totaled only yen 16,700.000 per annum.
This average increased to yen 110.000.000 from 1912 to 1915. and
to yen 436.000,000 from 1924 to 1926. Avera.ge annt^al exports to
the

China for these three periods, 1898 to 1902, 1912 to 1915. and 1924
to 1926 were yen 38,217,000. yen 143.245.000. and yen 409.583,000
respectively. This extraordinary increase in exports to China was

due mainly
customs

to

tarifTs

the exercise

and

The development
part,

due

to

of Japan's

imperiahstic privileges

in

extraterritorial rights.

of industries in Japan has been, for the most

low wages and

to

an increase

in

exports to China.

In
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grew up were those that retiuired contechnical skill. Inasmuch as such unrefined articles are not demanded in ad\anced countries of the
West. China naturally became the best buyer of Japan's industrial
the main, the industries that
siderable labor but very

^Moreover, China

products.

special rights secured

and

little

is

by the

latter as the result of

with Russia ga\c

later

her markets in China.

immediate neighbor and the

Taiwan's

special

Tai)an

The following

table

do not include raw

TABLE NO.

raw

Amt.

1887-92
29.585
1893-97
42.490
1898-02
134.049
1908-11
262.308
1912-15
404.910
1920-23
995.825
1924-26 11.286.092
I

|

I

|

I

|

I

I

I

|

|

325,802
409.583

|

j

Amt.

Per cent

6.856
12.162
38.218
77.946
143.245

|

|

|

|

|

1

|

23.17
28.63
28.51
29.72
35.38
32.72
30.18

total

KWAXTIXG

CHTXA PROPER

silk)

1000 ven)

export figures

2

China with Japan's

to

(in 1000 yen)
Total exports
Cnot inrliirline
(in

total

silk.

Comparison of exports
EXPORTS TO china:

Year

for extending

shows the dependence of

The

Japan's industries upon trade with China.

war with China

facilities

HoycivOyG

Per rent

.\'nt

\

\

\

|

i

i

I
|

|

|

I

|

|

18,912
25.463
82.721
63,538

7.21

|

6.29
6.29
7.10

I

i

|

export trade

I

|

\

|

8513
19

Total

Per cent

PI

34 521
22.049
30.753
63.528
63,538

28.78
44.98
25.75
8.41

7.59
6.38
4.94

Per rent
51.95
73.61
54.26
45.34
49.26
47.39

|

|

|

|

|

|

43 89
|

development of manufacturing industries in Japan
is due to exports to China is revealed by analyzing the principal export articles. In 1922 exports to China of the following articles
TIo\v mtich the

amounted
cles

and

to (S^\?)7 per cent of the total exports of those

same

arti-

cotton yarn, cotton fabrics, refined sugar, beer, paper, glass

:

glass articles,

umbreUas,

machines and their parts,

articles of iron,

rubber

and their ]iarts, cotton blankets, soap, hats,
and insulated electric wire. These include almost all important articles of exprn-t from Japan. That is to say. Japan depends upon China
for about 70 ])er cent of her i)rincipal ex|)ort trade. These figures
tires.

lam]:)s

explain clearly that Japan's industries, so far as foreign trade

concerned, depend

much upon exports

China has begim

to decrease in re-

the cause for this decrease?

The fimdamental

But Japan's export trade
cent years.

cause

\\'hat

lies in

China owing
is

now

is

low wages.

])assing

econonn'

Exports

to

In her

through the

])Ost-Restoration ^ears.
tional

to

the recent devel()i)ment
to

is
(

is

to China.

now
hina

.\

sta<.;o

siuiibii"

(.foing

fmiu

en

in

<if

manufacturing

indtistries in

manufacturing industries. China
whicli

|ai)an

experienced

r<Muark;d)le develoi)ment
(

in

her

of

na-

hina.

America or

(Ireat

I'ritain

are mostly

:
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more highly

In this

technical production countries like Jai)an and China are unahle to

compete.

The

industries s])rino;ing

the type that aiTect Japan.

u])

in

dustries have been undertaken in China with

Chinese have been able to coinnete
the help of a protective

duced

raw

in

silk,

tarift'.

China are as follows
refined

sugar,

therefore, of

Cliina are,

After the liuro])ean War. modern

The

i)rinci])al articles

beer,

in-

that the

the ja])anese even without

witli

now

being

cotton varn, fabrics, flour,

:

oils,

the

result

paj^er,

leather,

])ro-

matches,

handkerchiefs,

soap, toilet articles, candles, glass, cigarettes, cement, ribbons,

enam-

eled iron articles, canned provisions, umbrellas, knitted goods, towels,

hats etc.
rivals of
brellas,

Without a

single exception these articles are formidable

Japanese-made matches, umhave been driven entirely out of the
very severe blow to Japan's capitalistic

Japanese exports to China.

and towels, for

instance,

This is a
view of the fact that nearly one half of her exports of

Chinese markets.
industries, in

these articles depends
tariff

autonomy

upon China.

since 1930 has

^loreover, China's recovery of

made

it

possible for her to encour-

age domestic industries by means of a protective tariff' and thus
force foreign goods from her home markets. This has meant a further set-back to Japan's economy. Theoretically, Japan might expect a

new development by manufacturing

articles

which a younger nation

which require
China could

like

greater technical

skill

hardly compete.

In fact, some industries in Japan are progressing

in

in this direction, but the solution

of the present problem by such

means will be extremely difficult.
The rapid industrial development

of the early days

was due

the Meiji Government's bureaucratic protection and guidance.

paternal attitude
(

1

)

(2)

was characterized by the following

Tariffs for the protection of

home

to

This

policies

industries.

Subsidies to domestic producers for the purpose of increas-

profits.
Some of these subsidies were given in fixed
amounts of money as in the cases of navigation and iron manufacture, some by guaranteeing a certain rate of dividend, some bv giving tax exemptions or certain other privileges, and some by purchasing domestic-made articles irrespective of ]:)rices.
Low interest loans, for the purpose of lightening the burden
(3)
on capital, or a special law like the "Rice Act," by which the price
of an article was regulated in favor of certain groups.
Organization of certain enterprises by the Covernment and
(4)

ing

their

Till-:
A^;

it

XlllON IIASIM KUIIM.I.
.'ipj

—

1

.\

Nil. tl.XII.U Ol

As it appeared in
1883 (above)
Coni] are witb illustralion on
age 199

cared

in

1

19^9

loKN'O
(below)
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then selling them to prixatc inch'viduals at cxcepticjnally low prices.

This protective policy was successful

When

industries.

in its application to infant

these industries reached the condition to which

who were responsible for
fundamental reforms for which hard
were required, and tried to take an

reference has already heen made, those
their readjustment neglected

labor and

painful

sacrifice

The same

protective policy was then abused in order
up old and declining industries. Inasmuch as governmental protection under such circumstances would only help capitalists, it resulted simply in raising prices, and not in helping ineasier course.
to

bolster

fant industries.

When
ite

an industry begins

to decline, there

cause and the only real remedy
If protection

cause.

is

continued,

lies in
it

Japan

is

still

ment

1920

In spite of these plain

a slave to the protective policy.

amount of monev has been
tion of

spent in

An enormous

since the financial reac-

Japan
forms such as a protective

in various

defin-

simply encourages responsible

individuals to neglect the necessary reforms.
facts,

must be some

an attemi)t to remove such

tariff,

govern-

and the like, constituting a very
heavy burden laid directly or indirectly upon the people's shoulders.
Some of the articles on which the people have had to pay everincreasing prices have been treated as follows by the protective tariff":
wheat was duty free prior to treaty revision in 1899, but by the tariff revision of 1911 a duty of yen 1.85 per 100 kin was imposed,
and this was raised further in 1926 to yen 2.90 per 100 kin. For
subsidies,

financial

relief,

was raised to yen 15.30 per IOC'
and further to yen 23.00 in 1926. In the
same period, the duty on iron nails was raised from yen 0.572 to
yen 1.25 per 100 kin and further to yen 2.40. The duty on copper
was raised from yen 1.20 per 100 kin in 1911 to yen 7.00 per 100
cotton and plain tissues, the duty
kin in the revision of 1911.

kin in 1926.

The above

are typical cases

— others

might be

cited.

In addition

Government has been giving protection under various names and forms such as "subsidies" and
"financial relief," throueh the Central Treasury, the Bureau of Deposits (chiefly of the Postal Savings), the Bank of Japan and other

to the protection

special banks,

all

ly or indirectly.

bv the

tariff,

the

for the purpose of assisting capitalists either direct-

The Bank

of

Formosa alone obtained

relief

amount-

Other banks received yen 500,000,000.
through the Bank of Japan by way of special loans, making a total of
ing

to

yen

200,000.000.
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yen /OO.OOO.OCO on this one occasion alone. The money expended under the heads of "protection" and "rehef" must necessarily increas"
the cost of production eventually and thus weaken Japan's ability to

compete with other countries. Tf ])rotection is applied as a remedy
whenever Japan's capitalistic industries are confronted with a prohlem, it can only weaken the whole fabric in the long run. It becomes, as

At

it

were, a poison at the very root of industrial development.

the time of the Restoration of 1868, the samurai, the leisure

class of that

which a

time was abolished. The system of hereditary trade, by

class

of tradesmen monopolized certain trades,

was

also

abolished and the rule "no labor, no meat," was imposed upon the

whole nation. This great reform meant the sweeping away of the
conventional custom of leisure and luxury followed bv incompetent members of hereditary families, ushering in a new regime for
free competition open to every ambitious man. It was a sort of
country- wide mobilization for the purpose of consummating a capitalistic

system

in Ja]:)an.

The Russo-Japanese War
tory of Japan's economy.

is

the dividing line in the

For by

modern

his-

most of the leaders of
the great Restoration work, both in and out of the Ciovernment, had
either died or retired from active service, and had been succeeded
by their sons, or grandsons, who were mostly parasites or had become accustomed to a luxurious life far beyond their means or
talents, owing to the wealth bec|reathed to them by their predecessors.

The

leisure class,

that time,

once abolished was thus revived

in

this

younger generation, through inherited wealth. Many Japanese who
held property left to them by their parents came into the manage-

ment of business corporations or

of political parties, a situation not

considered by the general public as anything unusual.

men were

far

more luxurious than

iiigh jKjsitions in

is

really due,

and of production

more than anything

who had won
The extraordinary

their predecessors

society by their actual ability.

rise in the cost of living

Most of these

else,

after the Ruro]:)ean

to the luxurious

War

hal)its of this

leisure class.

Tile

increase of this class and their growing wealth

has been

accelerated through the (k'\eloi)ment of a system of investment and

other economic schemes.
(1)

.Many land-owners liaxc turni'd into leisured landlords.

live

.Many ca])ila]ists ha\e become mere idlers after learning to
on the interest and dixidends of tluir nione\- in\ested in securi-

ties

or deposited

(2)

in lianks.
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])cnsions or bonuses

upon go\ernmcnt

have

ciuietly increased.

The Government's

(4)

policies arc inclined too

the capitalists' interests, and as a result

much

most of the

who

general social progress go to these capitalists

in

favor of

benefits

due

to

simply increase

number belonging to the leisured class.
After the installation of the Hamaguchi Cabinet of which he was
a member, the late Finance Minister Inouye- issued a pamphlet entitled "An Appeal to the People on the Reform of National Economy
the

and the Removal of Gold Embargo," in which he advocated a soIn this pamphlet, Air. Inouye decalled "retrenchment policy."
scribed "the cancer" of present-day Japanese

of spending

more than

is

and the people for this.

economy

earned, and he blames both the

as consisting

Government

In part he wrote as follows:

During the Great W'av, Japan had an extraordinary
revenue and arranged her finances according to her revenue.
But when the revenue decreased she did not reduce the cost
of living. On the contrary, the cost of living has increased
in spite of the reduced income. I believe this is a true description of the condition throughout the country. It is a
common rule all over the world that one ought to arrange
one's living according to one's income. This common law is
being violated in Japan. The Government, for instance, instead of retrenching, is borrowing some yen 100,000,000 in
spite of the large deficit. ^ Most Japanese, riot only individuals

but also corporations and banks, have fallen into this habit,
and herein is the reason why the economic world of Japan is
so unstable and unsound.
Though everyone knows this truth, the difficulty lies in accepting its lessons. In the case of the Government, for example, it is only a matter of reducing expenditure since the
revenue has decreased, but this fias not been done. The same

They are still accustomed to their old
is true of the people.
habits of luxury which were contracted when they had large
incomes, and are yet unable to adjust their habits to changed
circumstances. What is the consequence of all this? Simply
that prices do not come down. Living is unstable. The embargo on gold, the great obstacle to economic rehabilitation,
Should such a condition be allowed to conis still in force.
tinue, business will go from bad to worse, and the world of
finance in Japan will remain unstable. The much discussed
-]\Ir.

Inouye was assassinated

in

January, 1932.

(Q.W.)

greatly increased military expenditures since the beginning of the
jNIanchurian Campaign in September. 1931. and abandonment of the gold
standard in December. 1931. has tremendously increased the government's

•The

deficit

and dependence on borrowing. (Q.W.)
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"depravity of thought" is due primarily to unsound economic
is. to the popular habit of continuing a luxurious life when income has decreased. Should appropriate reform be neglected, there can be no proper development in
national affairs. For the economic reform is a national reform, and the former will be the sole and only way for the
future development of Japan as a nation.
conditions, that

This was a very suggestive warning to those
sible for the

who

are respon-

unsound condition of the world of finance after the

re-

1920. for they neglected the necessary readjustment of

action of

their businesses, and continued the "bogus dividend-paying policy,"
and other temporizing and makeshift management. As a matter of
fact,

"the readjustment of business,"

European War, or more

men

was

in order

soon after the

exactly, after the reaction of 1920.

But the

interested in the investment of capital persistently avoided this

important and necessary
their efforts

work.

Instead,

upon temporizing measures.

like that of th.e

c|uack doctor,

who

they have

concentrated

Such a policy

is

exactly

puts off a necessary operation

This loss of economic
went on for several years, and the financial crisis which
Japan early in 1927 was but an exposure of the futility of

with the resulting daily loss of strength.
vitality

visited

\Miy, then, did these capitalists continue such foolish

makeshifts.

makeshifts?

(

might mention the following four fundamental

)ne

reasons.

The

(1)
talists

necessary adjustment was too sweeping for these capi-

with any prospect of the continuation of their

to carry out

business.

By

(2)

the

same token, should they attempt thorough adjustment

of their l)usiness, they might lose their positions as directors, and

bring bankrui:)tcy to some of the shareholders.

The Government's

(3)

])olicy

loss to innocent i^eojile, leaving

the necessarv readjustment

of "financial relief" transferred the

room

and indulge

for the capitalists to neglect
in

temporizing measures.

The ca])italists entertained false hopes of future i^rosperity.
(4)
The ]iolicy of "relief" and the ho]x>s it has fostered, have deeply
im])lantcd a spirit of dependence in the Japanese world of finance.
;\

glance

at

ijolitical

conditions after the European

careful observer of the fact that

i)olitics

War

reminds a

can easily be utilized for the

relief of the big capitalists.

When
direct

and

from their Imsiness decreased, and other losses,
were sustained due to the decline of prices, our

the j^rofits
indirect,
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did not mal<e the necessarx" readjitstment by re-

ducing capital or di^idends,

Ijut

instead, tried to deceive the public

by a pretended maintenance of their

credit.

The

directors of large

concerns, decided to continue high rates of dividends in spite of the
unprofitable condition of their business, and, hence, were forced to
tamper with the books. With continuing high dividends, these corporations suffered more than ever from shortage of funds. At first,
the deficit was covered by means of loans from banks. But when
this became impossible, the responsible men proposed to the shareholders an increase of the capital, or else resorted to debentures from
public subscribers, in order to ol^tain funds for bogus dividends.
The fund obtained by the increased capital or debentures, was not
used for the business, but mainly for the payment of these false
dividends or for meeting past losses.

In order to continue such temporizing measures,

it

was neces-

sary for the directors to hide the serious condition of the company's
business,

for had the condition

become known

to

the

]:)ul)Hc,

no

shareholders would have favored an increase of the capital, nor

would outsiders have subscribed to the debentures to be issued by
such a company. Directors, therefore, endeavored to show that
their companies were in a sound condition liy continuing the high
and fictitious dividends. As for the shareholders, who paid for
the proposed increase of capital, they would accept the high dividends and if necessary, borrow from the banks for the purpose of
paying up the additional capital. These shareholders had to depend
upon high dividends in order to pay the interest on their bank loans,
for should the rate of dividend
to the bank, the shareholders

Thev would, under

fall

below the rate of interest payable

would be threatened with bankruptcy.

those circumstances, invariably oppose a reduc-

were proposed by other shareThese companies, therefore, became involved in a hopedilemma in which the continuation of bogus dividends was ab-

tion of dividends, if such reduction

holders.
less

solutely necessary.

While Japanese capitalists were trying to readjust their business by means of compromise and even illegal measures, the Government

also resorted to various measures, for the purpose of assisting

these caoitalists.

Since the financial slump of

1920 the Govern-

ment repeatedly resorted to such temporizing measures. The first
of these was the policy of fixing prices after they had begun to decline, bv means of the funds held at the central Treasury and in the
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Bureau of Deposits. When prices take a very serious and sudden
drop without adequate reason, a policy to prevent further decline
is not necessarily a temporizing measure.
But the case was cjuite

Under

different.

ment

the pleasing

name

of "regulation," the Govern-

tried to prevent a decline of prices that

was

in

complete accord

with normal principles of economy, for the purpose of lightening
losses incurred hy capitalists.
As a result, ibices in Japan
remained higher than the international level for a long time, caus-

the

ing an inactive condition of export trade and a constant excess of

imports, therehy weakening Japan's industrial foundations.

The Government
state

funds held

by giving

under the name "financial relief," misused
Treasury and the Bureau of Deposits,
wealthy capitalists only, and thus helping them
also

at the central

relief to

The most outstanding cases
were relief given to the Kokusai Kisen Kaisha (a steamship company), the Kwasaki Ship-building Company, the Bank of Formosa,
the Bank of Chosen, and Suzuki & Company.
to continue their temporizing measures.

After the great earthcjuake of 1923, moreover, the Government
took measures which were responsible for the sharp decline in ex-

change rates and the consequent unnatural rise in prices. The deexchange was due to a laisscc-fairc policy, and the conse-

cline of

quent higher prices only helped the capitalists to make ends meet
instead of hastening

fundamental readjustments. They were thus

relieved of the immediate burden, but with very disastrous results
in the

long run. For in 1926,

when

the exchange began to improve,

One industry after
The extraordinary rise in ex-

business again suffered a painful depression.
another, was threatened with failure.

change rates

and lead

in the latter half of

other measures of protection, the
in

1926 proved a very severe blow

By higher tariff's and
Government caused further delay

to the financial crisis early in 1927.

readjustment.

Cnder

the present system of national economy, such tcmi)orizing

measures were

first

reflected

in

the increase of fixed loans

banks, and a consef|uent shortage of funds

in

the banks.

from

This policy

brought bank failures as early as the middle of 1021. The two semigovernment banks, the Dank nf l'^)rmosa and the I'ank of Chosen,

begrm to siitTcr from accumulated luans and exhausted funds. To
meet the situation, they absorbed call ile])()sits amounting to several
hundred millinn yen. COmmercial baulks. t(i<>, began to vie with
one another in inviting deposits in order to obtain necessary funds
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new

for

Many

loans.

of increased capital.
tide

banks tried to

oret

IN

As

crises.

interest

hi,<,di

was favored with

Thit in this

wake

the rate of interest steadily rose in the

\\'hen Japan

means

loans to

a rule, after a financial

such as that of 1920, the rate of interest declines.
try,
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additional funds by

Other l)anks obtained

them over threatening

JAPAN

a most ])rosperous

slump
coun-

of the reaction.

boom

in 1919, for

instance, the highest current rate of discount on commercial bills

was

3.5 sen per

day per 100 yen, the average being 2.09 sen. Durmounted to 4 sen and the average was

ing 1925 and since, the rate
2.6 sen or higher.

The reason why such an abnormal

interest followed the financial
1920 was that the temporizing measures we have described brought about an ever-increasing waste of money. Both

reaction of

companies and banks were unable
so that the urgent

demand

funds to redeem their debts,

to get

for funds persuaded

them

to float

more

loans irrespective of rates of interest, which naturally rose under

such peculiar circumstances.

The end

of

these temporizing measures

shortage of funds, which threatened failure.

was a disclosure of

The indebted

business

corporations and banks, tmable to redeem loans, merelv increased
their losses

by

shifts

and subterfuges.

temporizing absolutely impossible.

sudden

rise in

exchange rates

exporters dealing in raw

in

Some

At

this

of

them found further
was a

juncture, there

1926, causing considerable loss to

and other goods. Those banks and
business companies which had been weakened to the utmost were
silk

unable to continue their lending policy.

For the purpose of preventing failure both capitalists and the
Government, conversant with the situation, hit upon a device in the
form of "a bill for remedial disposal of earthquake alTected notes,"
introduced in the Imperial Diet early in 1927, and calling for the

This fund was like
The Government intended

disbursement of yen 107,000,000.
injection to a dying patient.

a
to

camphor
lift

the

embargo on gold as a result of the "relief" measure, but it was too
late. While the bill was under discussion in the Diet, the financial
disorder became known to sections of the public, and two or three
banks sufl'ered runs in March, 1927. In April such large banks as
the Jugo Ginko (Fifteenth luank) and the Bank of Formosa had
to close their doors, thus ruining the credit of

verv serious manner.

Japan abroad

in

a
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How

may l)c seen from the fact
meet it, the Government declared a three-month
moratorium promulgated on April 23 for instantaneous enforcewhich was a most extraordinary measure according to the
ment
law of Japan, and in the meantime, an extraordinary session of the
Imperial Diet had to meet (for five days from ]\Iay 3). In this extraordinary Diet session, the following two hills were passed:
(1)
A bill for compensating possible losses from special loans to he made
acute this financial crisis was.

rnat in order to
(

.

)

by the P.ank of Japan within the limit of yen 500,000,000:

A

for

bill

accommodating the monetary organs

in

(2)

Formosa amount-

ing to yen 2C0.0C0,CC0.

Rut before the actual enforcement of the extraordinary "relief"
measure, thirty-six banks had closed their doors with a

total paid

and deposits amounting to about yen
794.000,000, of which a large portion was already classified under
"losses." When the crisis reached a climax, banks prepared huge
amounts of money for possible payment of deposits. These amounts
may be approximately inferred from the note issue of the Bank of
Japan, which, prior to March 15, was about yen 1,080,000,000 but on
April 2?, increased to yen 2,659,000,000 so that the amount prepared by banks for the possible payment of deposits was about yen

up

capital of yen 96,800,000,

1,600,000,000.

On

account of this extraordinary note issue, the

P)ank of Ja]mn had to release

all

the reserve notes in store, and at

same time make further extraordinary
meet the urgent demands.
the

issues of

new

notes to

Needless to say, another "readjustment of business" on a larger
scale

became necessary. A large number of banks, companies, facand commercial houses of various standings were liquidated.

tories,

The
ment

terror of

the crisis, however,

failed to persuade the gf^vern-

authorities as well as the capitalists of the need of thorough

readjustment.

I'or they

sought a remedial measure

traordinary i)arliamentary

world of Jai)an was

bills,

im])f)sed a

in these

two ex-

with the result that on the financial

heavy biu-den of

al)Out 87*^,000,000

ven, transferred to the shoulders of the peoi)le to relieve a small

from imminent failure. The intended relief
from complete, for e\en in 1929 readjustment was considered necessary as may be seen from the ai)i)eal of I'inance IVIinister Inouye to the people from which (piotations were given above.
secti(Mi

was

far

of the nation

